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Social theorists have a long-standing interest in political protest.
They have investigated its causes, the various forms it takes and the 
correlates of its success or failure. It might be presumed that an interest 
in collective protest is spurred by its relatively common occurrence. The 
overwhelming majority of contemporary political systems are characterized by 
substantial social, economic and political inequalities. As a result, one ^ 
might expect collective action against inequality on every hand. However, 
that is not the case. Collective protest is a relatively rare occurrence. * ^  
Quiescence and passivity, rather than chaos and protest, are the normal state 
of affairs in the majority of the world’s polities.
The relative stability of political systems with high levels of 
inequality can be attributed to one or more of several factors. First, the 
less advantaged may be intimidated by the superior power and resources of the ^  I !׳#
j i-T i'more advantaged. Under those circumstances, the disadvantaged may fail to act r |^c 
because they lack the resources necessary to resolve their dilemma. Second, 
the less advantaged may not initiate collective action because they are
unaware of their true interests as a result of elite control of national
cultural and symbolic systems. Finally, others (cf. Stolte, 1983) have a r g u e d ^ ״
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that the roots of quiescence are social psychological. The disadvantaged are x , 0
presumed to have lower self evaluations than the more advantaged. As a result
the disadvantaged eventually accept the belief that they are deserving of
\their lot. Put differently, they recognize their disadvantage but accept it J?as equitable. r ¡ ' }
Undoubtedly, differences in power, the existence of false consciousness (
v
and of low levels of self regard play important roles in reducing collective 
action against inequality. However, it is also likely that legitimacy plays y/
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an important role in both the initiation of collective action and in its 
suppression.
It is well known that the actual use of power to maintain inequality is 
inefficient and potentially destabilizing. As a consequence, most regimes 
seek to establish the legitimacy of the institutions which create and/or 
maintain inequality (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Indeed, early theories of * 
collective action (e.g. Smelser, 1963) pointed to the breakdown of legitimacy 
as an important precondition of collective protest.
More recent formulations (Bachrach and Baratz, 1972; McCarthy and Zald, / 
1977) point to the positive influence of legitimacy on collective action.
They reject the notion that collective action can be sharply distinguished 
from other forms of social behavior. Collective action is conceived as a 
rational attempt to mobilize resources for the attainment of collective 
purposes rather than as a non-rational response to the breakdown of social 
order. Collective action is generally assumed to focus on gaining control of 
powerful positions within the polity, i.e. the organization of successful 
revolutionary coalitions.
When viewed from this perspective legitimation increases the likelihood 
that a movement will be successful. There would appear to be two distinct but 
related effects of legitimation on movement success. First, legitimation 
assists groups in their efforts to define their actions as protest activity 
rather than as criminal behavior (Gamson, 1975; Lauderdale, 1980). A 
movement’s ability to attract supporters and resources is enhanced if it 
acquires legitimacy (Gamson, 1975).
Second, collective action is unlikely to occur if its goals or its 
potential leaders lack legitimacy and/or are unable to obtain it. Potential
adherents will be less likely to engage in movement activities if those 
activities lack legitimacy. Furthermore, political actors expect that actions 
which lack legitimacy will garner sanctions from authorities and peers. /
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While legitimacy proves a useful concept for furthering our understanding 
of collective action, its use has generated new problems as well. One of the 
central issues concerns the relative importance of individually-based and 
collectively-based legitimacy to the recruitment of support for collective 
action. The research reported here examines the effects of collectively-based 
and individually-based legitimacy on the support of protest against an 
inequitable communication structure. /
Theory
Weber (1968) discussed two distinct, but related, conceptions of a 
legitimate order. The first states that a legitimate order consists of 
"determinable maxims" or rules which are held as binding by the collective.
This constitutive function of legitimacy is clearly illustrated in task 
situations or play. Legitimate rules establish collective definitions of 
meaningful behavior, i.e. by establishing criteria by which individuals can 
determine whether an act is meaningful or not. Indeed, there are behaviors in 
every political system which are not meaningful. They are the options not 
perceived, and consequently, not chosen— the actions which are politically 
impossible (Friedrich, 1958). '
The second conception points to the evaluative aspects of a legitimate \ '  J׳v
*
order (Jackson, 1965). That is a legitimate order is also an order which 
describes desirable models of action (Weber, 1968), i.e. behaviors which are 
socially appropriate.1 Members of the relevant collectivity are often rated 
on the basis of their success or failure in complying with behavioral
behavior which group members evaluate as desirable. Although they can be ^
distinguished, the constitutive and evaluative functions of legitimacy are / \ A ׳
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highly correlated in most social orders.
Following Dornbusch and Scott (1975), we have argued that the legitimacy
of an institution, position or person can be established from the perspective
of any or all of three sources (Walker et al., 1986; Zelditch and Walker,/1
1984). Individually-based legitimacy, an individual’s belief in the 
legitimacy of an act, person or institution is referred to as propriety.
, S'Legitimacy also emanates from the collectivity. Institutions, persons or / $
&  ^^
actions which acauire collective legitimation are said to be valid. It is the / i 1' M  V¿
validity of an institution or group, not its propriety, which implies the bk/1 IA
support of others. Legitimation which is sustained by the backing of • ^ tr ׳
superordinate agents of the collectivity is called authorization. P h
№
Authorization can be contrasted with endorsement, the legitimation of acts, rJ y  ^
A (1¡ o'0persons or positions by lower participants in the collectivity.  ^ |
Propriety is an important determinant of action. An individual ijs r
expected to comply more readily with rules which she or he believes to be 
legitimate. Similarly, an individual ought to be more likely to take action 
against policies or procedures which do not possess propriety. On the other 
hand, it is not clear that actors will commit their resources to collective 
action simply because the goals of the movement are consistent with their own 
or because they believe its leaders are behaving legitimately. Our own 
research (Walker et al., 1987) demonstrates that propriety is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to persuade individuals to initiate collective 
protest.
standards which are legitimated bv the collectivity or for engaging in i 0
/> W ’
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«Proposition 2.: For any two actors, P and 0, 0’s support of P’s protest 
action, Ap, varies directly with the validity of Ap or the objectives of Ap.
Propositions 3 and 4 specify the relationship between propriety and 
validity and the imposition of sanctions against those who initiate collective 
protest. It might be expected that group members would be willing to commit 
personal resources to bolster actions which they believe to possess propriety. 
Alternatively, group members might be expected to expend their own resources 
to punish those who take actions which do not possess propriety. However, it 
is not clear that the propriety of actions [or the violation of propriety] is 
a sufficient ground for exercising collective sanctions.
As an example, any individual may believe that P’s actions lack 
propriety. It is unlikely that collective resources will be utilized to 
punish P or that collective action will be directed against P for violating 
the sensibilities of any individual.2 Collective sanctions are substantially 
more likely to be employed if the relevant actions are judged on the basis of 
their validity.
Proposition 3.: For any two actors, P and 0, 0 ’s support of collective 
sanctions against P’s protest action, Ap, is unrelated to the propriety of Ap 
or^the objectives of Ap.
Proposition 4.: For any two actors, P and 0, 0 ’s support of collective 
sanctions against P’s protest action, Ap, varies inversely with the validity 
of Ap the objectives of Ap.
We report the results of two experiments in the present paper. Each 
investigation is concerned with the effects of variation in the sources of 
legitimacy on the support of collective action and on the imposition of 
sanctions. The investigations share a number of common features. First, the
6
studies use the same task and the same centralized communication system. 
Second, all experimental subjects occupy peripheral positions in the 
centralized structure. In each study, the experimenter establishes the
doing so. An experimental confederate proposes to change the communication 
system on the first of an expected ten trials. The primary dependent variable
communication network is varied by making it clear to the subjects that 
changing the network would damage the objectives of the experiment or by 
omitting that part of the instructions. Propriety is varied by introducing
The second experiment examines the effects of endorsement and propriety 
on the support of collective action. Propriety is varied, as in Study 1, by 
s[ introducing inequality into the situation. Endorsement is varied by
introducing a balloting procedure to establish the group’s preference for a 
communication structure to be used in the study. Group preferences are 
communicated to the subjects by the experimenter who provides feedback which
possibility of changing the communication system and a set of mechanisms for
is whether a subject allies with the confederate in the attempt to change the
/ The first study examines the relative effects of authorization and
propriety on the support of collective action. Authorization of the
communication system (a measure of support).
/
J inequality into the situation.
purports to be the group’s vote.3
The research design permits us to use Study 1 to test the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1.1.: Compared to S’s for whom use of the communication
structure is improper, S’s who believe the structure 
possesses propriety are less likely to support attempts to 
change it.
Compared to S’s for whom use of the communication 
structure is not authorized, S’s for whom use of the 
structure is authorized are less likely to support 
attempts to change it.
Compared to S’s for whom use of the communication 
structure is improper, S’s who believe the structure 
possesses propriety are just as likely to sanction group 
members who initiate attempts to change it.
Compared to S’s for whom use of the communication 
structure is not authorized, S’s for whom use of the
Hypothesis 1.2.:
Hypothesis 1.3.
Hypothesis 1.4.
structure is authorized are more likely to sanction group---  |s
members who initiate attempts to change it.
We expect similar results from Study 2 as follows:
Hypothesis 2.1.: Compared to S’s for whom use of the communication
structure is improper, S’s who believe the structure 
possesses propriety are less likely to support attempts to 
change it.
Hypothesis 2.2.: Compared to S’s who believe that the majority of their
group voted against the communication structure, S’s who 
believe that the majority voted for the structure are less 
likely to support attempts to change it.
structure is improper, S’s who believe the structure 
possesses propriety are just as likely to sanction group 
members who initiate attempts to change it.
Hypothesis 2.4.: Compared to S’s who believe that the majority of their
group voted against the communication structure, S’s who ^
y  I ׳believe that the majority voted for the structure are less 
v ^  ־ likely to sanction group members who initiate attempts to|^
change it.
Study 1: Authorization, Propriety and Support of Collective Protest 
Subjects and Procedures
The subjects in this investigation were 100 undergraduate males who 
served as paid volunteers. Twelve subjects were dropped from the study due to 
their failure to understand the instructions or because they expressed 
suspicion about the experimental procedures. Statistical analyses are 
performed on the data for the remaining 88 subjects.
Setting and Procedures
The research utilized a standard experimental setting (see Walker et al., 
1986). Each participant was seated alone in an experimental room immediately
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upon arriving at the laboratory in order to minimize contact among the 
subjects. Each room was equipped with a desk, chair, audio speaker, 
signalling device, and a variety of messages slips.4 All instructions were 
transmitted by prerecorded audio tape.
The subjects were informed that they were members of a five-person team 
which would work two practice problems and a series of ten criterion problems.
Every team was assigned to work in a "wheel" structure (Bavelas, 1950) with
Hypothesis 2.3.: Compared to S’s for whom use of the communication
one central position and four peripheral positions. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to positions in the wheel by drawing colored tokens upon entering the 
laboratory.5
Subjects in the peripheral positions of the wheel could only communicate 
with the center position which was occupied by a confederate. Group members 
in peripheral positions could request the center to forward messages to other 
peripheral positions and were told that the center was required to pass those 
messages on. The subjects were also told how to make changes in the 
communication structure.
Any member of the group could initiate collective action to change the 
communication structure by making a motion that the group vote to add one or 
more communication channels to the structure. If a second member of the group 
supported the call for a vote, the office was required to conduct an election 
and team members were to vote by secret ballot. If a majority approved the 
proposal, the new channels were added and the team was assessed a small fee 
($.05 for each additional channel) on each trial that the changes were to be 
in effect.
Each team member was given some information at the start of each problem­
solving period which could be used in combination with information held by 
other team members to solve the task. The solution to each problem was a 
five-point, multi-line graph (cf. Faucheux and Mackenzie 1966; Mackenzie 
1976). Team members were required to use written messages in order to 
exchange information and to solve the problems. Each subject had to assemble 
the completed information set and draw the solution graph after a complete 
exchange of information was accomplished. A problem was completed when the 
office received an answer from each of the subjects.
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There was a three-minute interval between criterion trials during which 
the results were tabulated. The team members were informed that the team 
would earn S.50 for each correct answer on every trial.6 The earnings were to 
be divided equally among all members of the team at the conclusion of the 
study.
Creating Propriety
The subjects worked two practice problems after they had heard the 
general instructions. One-half of the subjects began work on the ten 
criterion trials immediately after they received the results of the second 
practice problem. The other half of the subjects heard a message which was 
designed to introduce inequality into the setting. Team members were told 
that a bonus of $2.50 would be paid to the team member who turned in the first 
correct answer on each of the ten criterion trials. The host experimenter 
justified the payment as an incentive to work faster. The pattern of 
information flow in the wheel structure ensured that the confederate occupying 
the center position in the network would always win the bonus and earn 
substantially more than subjects in the peripheral positions. It was assumed 
that the bonus would lead subjects to treat the wheel as undesirable, i.e. 
improper. The remainder of the procedures in this treatment were identical to 
those given to subjects who did not receive the bonus treatment.7 
Legitimating the Communication Structure
Use of the wheel structure was validated by authorization. One-half of 
the subjects (those in the High Authorization treatments) heard a message 
which linked continued use of the wheel to the scientific purpose of the 
study. They were provided a fictitious history of research using the wheel 
structure after they completed the first practice problem. The message
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indicated that the rental procedure was included as a feature of this 
particular study in order to replicate the procedures used in an earlier 
investigation. At that point, the host experimenter summarized the study’s 
purpose by stating:
"What we want to study is the detailed pattern of information 
flow in restricted communication systems. On the eighth problem we 
will measure the detailed pattern of information flow. To 
successfully measure this pattern, we need you to continue with the 
same restricted communication system for at least eight problems 
after you complete the two practice problems."
This instruction was designed to validate continued use of the wheel 
structure by emphasizing the legitimacy of its purpose. Put another way, the 
procedure made change prior to completion of the eighth trial illegitimate. 
Even though change was still possible under the rules of participation, 
initiating change prior to the ninth problem would appear to undermine the 
purpose of the investigation and render it less meaningful. Participants 
worked the second practice problem after they heard the instruction, completed 
a short questionnaire, heard the description of the bonus (in the Low 
Propriety treatment), and then began the ten criterion trials. Subjects in 
the Low Authorization treatment were not exposed to any additional information 
beyond a basic description of the study.
Support of Collective Action
The experimenter sent each subject a change proposal after the first 
criterion trial was completed. Ostensibly, the proposal was from another 
occupant of a peripheral position in the group.3 The subject could second 
(support) the proposal or refuse to do so. After a three-minute interval, the
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subjects’ responses were noted and the problem-solving session was terminated. 
All subjects completed a post-session questionnaire, were interviewed, 
debriefed, and paid for their participation.
Results
The principal behavioral results are summarized in Table 1. Thirty-five 
percent of all S’s support a proposal to change the communication structure. 
Sixteen (51.2%) of the S’s who believed the wheel structure was improper 
supported change. Only 26.3% -  15) of'S’s who believed the wheel structure 
was proper supported change. Similarly, fewer S’s supported a proposal to
change the structure when was authorized by the experimenter (25%) than
Two-thirds of the subjects supported a change proposal when they believed 
an unauthorized wheel structure was improper. When the communication 
structure was authorized by the experimenter only 37.5% of the subjects who 
believed it to be improper supported a motion to change the wheel. Similarly, 
slightly more than one-third of S’s (34%) who believed the wheel was proper 
supported a change proposal when use of the wheel was not authorized. Only
18% of subjects who believed the wheel was proper supported change when 
continued use of the structure was authorized by the experimenter.
These analyses treat the categorical variable SUPPORT as dependent (cf. 
Fienberg, 1980:97). SUPPORT takes the value 0, if a subject decides not to 
support a proposal for changing the communication structure and 1 when the
when the structure was not authorized (45.4%).
Table 1 about here
data are displayed in Table 2.
subject supports the change proposal. The independent variables are VALIDITY 
and PROP. VALIDITY takes the value 0 when continued use of the wheel is not 
legitimated and 1 when the experimenter legitimates it on the basis of the 
purpose of the study. PROP takes the value 0 when a subject indicates a 
belief that the wheel structure is not proper and 1 when the indication is 
that the wheel is proper (see note 7). We employed hierarchical modeling 
procedures in order to evaluate four models, the saturated model, the main 
effects model and two single parameter effect models.
Table 3 about here
The best fitting model is the main effects model. It is superior to 
either of the single-parameter models (compare change LHR chi-square values in 
column 5). The coefficients indicate that both PROP and VALIDITY have 
significant negative effects on the log-odds of support. That is, the odds of 
support decline significantly when continued use of the wheel structure is 
either proper or authorized. These findings are consistent with an intuitive 
interpretation of the data in Table 1.
The data support hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2. Propriety and authorization 
have powerful effects on individual decisions to support proposals to change 
the communication structure. Those who believe that the wheel structure 
possesses propriety are less likely to support proposals to change it. The 
support of change proposals is also reduced significantly when continued use 
of the structure is authorized on the basis of its importance to the goals of 
the investigation.
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Table 3 about here
The data in Table 3 are the numbers and proportions of S’s who agree to 
sanction the group member who initiated collective action to change the 
communication network. The data are tabulated from responses to an item on 
the post-session questionnaire which asked S’s if they would be willing to 
i  work in the same group with that participant in a future investigation.9 The 
data in Table 4 are the results of logit analyses of the effects of PROP and 
VALIDITY on sanctioning.
Table 4 about here
The data in Table 4 indicate that the best fitting model is a single­
parameter model with VALIDITY as the sole effect variable. The coefficient 
for VALIDITY is negative and statistically significant. The odds that an S 
will sanction a group member who initiates an attempt to change the 
communication network fall dramatically if continued use of the wheel 
structure has been authorized by the host experimenter.
Study 2: Propriety. Endorsement and Support of Collective Action
The results of Study 1 imply that the likelihood that group members will 
support attempts to change a communication network is reduced if they believe 
that the network is desirable or if the experimenter authorizes its continued 
use. Study 2 examines the effects of propriety and endorsement (the expressed 
support of similar others) on support of collective action.
Subjects. Setting and Procedures
Subjects in this investigation were 90 female undergraduate students who 
volunteered to serve as paid participants in a study of communication 
processes. Ten subjects were dropped from the study due to their failure to 
understand procedures or for expressing suspicion about experimental 
procedures. We report findings for the remaining- 80 subjects.
Study 2 employs the standard experimental setting described above but 
there are several differences in the two investigations. First, in addition 
to being told that this was a study of group problem solving, subjects were 
told that the researchers were interested in the efficiency of communication 
structures. In particular, the present study was reputed to be concerned with 
comparing the efficiency of the "wheel" structure and the "all-to-all" 
structure.10 Diagrams of the two structures were displayed on the walls above 
the subjects’ desks.
Second, as in Study 1, subjects were instructed on the procedures for 
changing structures. However, the only option available to the group was a 
change from the wheel to the all-to-all structure. Subjects were not 
permitted to add "only a few" extra channels. If the group members decided to 
change from the wheel to the all-to-all structure they were assessed a fee of 
25 cents (or 5 cents per person) per trial.
Third, in order to vary the propriety of the wheel, half of the subjects 
were given the bonus treatment after the first practice problem. The amount 
of the bonus was reduced by $1.00 (to $1.50) so that it would not be so large 
as to exceed earnings and produce excessive pressure to change structures 
regardless of other experimental procedures.
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Even though S’s were assigned to work in the wheel structure, they were 
given the opportunity to express their preferences for the wheel or the all- 
to-all structure. The S’s expressed their preferences in a poll which was 
administered after the second practice trial was completed. Each S’s 
preference was recorded by the experimenter and fictitious results were 
distributed which indicated that either 4 of 5 group members preferred the 
wheel or that 4 of 5 members preferred the all-to-all network. After they 
received the results of the poll, all of the S’s completed a brief 
questionnaire on which they expressed the degree to which they approved of the 
wheel structure and their perception of its efficiency.
Finally, after the instructions were summarized the S’s began the first 
criterion trial. After the criterion trial was completed each subject 
received a fictitious change message which they could choose to support or 
not. After a three-minute interval, their responses were recorded and their 
participation in the study was terminated. All subjects answered a post­
session questionnaire, were interviewed and debriefed and paid for their 
participation.
Results
The data in Table 5 are the basic data on support of change proposals. 
Fifty-six percent of all S’s supported the proposal to change from the wheel 
to the all-to-all network. S’s who attributed propriety to the wheel, i.e. 
expressed approval of its use, were least likely to support proposals to 
change it with 38.8% [19 of 49] supporting a change to the all-to-all network. 
Among S’s who expressed disapproval of the wheel structure, 83.9% (26 of 31) 
supported the initiative to change to the all-to-all network. There is a 
similar effect of endorsement (ENDORSE). More than 72% of S’s who believed
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that 4 members of their group had voted against the wheel supported the 
proposal to change to the all-to-all structure. The level of support fell to 
40% among those who were led to believe that 4 of 5 members of their group had 
initially voted for the wheel.
Table 5 about here
Among S’s who approved the wheel, 56.5% supported change when the wheel 
was not endorsed. Only 23.1% of S’s who approved the wheel and were 
subsequently told that it was endorsed by a majority of their group supported 
the change proposal. For S’s who disapproved the wheel, 94.1% supported 
change when the wheel structure was not endorsed by a majority of the group 
members. Support dropped off to 71.4% when the wheel was endorsed by the 
group.
Table 6 about here
The data in Table 6 are the results of log-4io^ar analyses of the data. 
The analyses permit comparison of the goodness of fit of four models. The 
dependent variable, as in Study 1, is SUPPORT, the subject’s decision on 
whether to support the change proposal. The independent variables are PROPER, 
S’s approval or disapproval of the wheel, and ENDORSE, whether a majority of 
the team voted for or against the wheel. PROPER takes the value 1 when an S 
approves or approves strongly of the wheel. All other responses are coded 0. 
ENDORSE is set at 0 when an S is told that 4 of 5 group members voted against 
the wheel and 1 when the vote was for the wheel.
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The main-effects model best fits the data in this investigation.11 Both 
PROPER and ENDORSE have significant negative effects on the likelihood of 
support. Subjects who believe the wheel structure is proper and subjects who 
are told that a majority of the group supports the wheel are less likely to 
support a proposal to change to the all-to-all network.
Sanctions
One item on the post-session questionnaire asked S’s whether they would 
recommend keeping members of their group in future studies or if they would 
recommend dropping them. Only 3 of 59 S’s who answered the item pertaining to 
the group member who initiated the change proposal were willing to sanction 
her by excluding her from further studies. This finding is surprising, 
inconsistent with the responses reported in Study 1, and with our hypotheses. 
We will explore potential explanations for this finding in the discussion 
section.
Discussion
The compliance findings from both investigations are consistent with our 
hypotheses which are generated from previous work on legitimation processes. 
S’s in both investigations are less likely to support proposals to change a 
communication network which they believe to possess propriety. Additionally, 
S’s in Study 1 are less likely to support change when continued use of the 
communication network is legitimated through authorization by the host 
experimenter. Finally, S’s in Study 2 are less likely to support change 
proposals when the communication network is endorsed by their coworkers.
The findings on compliance reported here parallel some of our earlier 
work concerning the effects of legitimation processes on the initiation of 
change proposals (cf. Walker et al., 1986 and Thomas et al., 1986). That
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research demonstrates that the propriety of actions, and whether actions are
*
endorsed and/or authorized all have important effects on the likelihood that
«public attempts to pursue them will be made.
Some collective action theorists (cf. McCarthy and Zald, 1977) have
more likely to attract adherents and their resources than movements which lack 
legitimacy. Similarly, we have argued (Zelditch and Walker, 1984) that an 
important function of legitimating institutions and movements is the effect of 
legitimation on the likelihood of social support.
The research reported here would appear to be consistent with an 
extension of those arguments. Three different forms of legitimacy have 
important effects on the likelihood that experimental subjects fail to support 
proposals to change a communication network which creates disadvantage for
them. By agreeing to support a change proposal the subject is committing him
C§)or herself to a coalition which could effect change. Finally, subjects are 
also required to give up some (modest amount) of their resources if their 
coalition is successful in creating change. Our findings indicate that 
legitimating inequality substantially reduces social support for movements 
designed to reduce or eliminate it. Our findings suggest that attempts to 
initiate collective action are less likely to acquire public support if they 
are not legitimated. When coupled with our findings on the initiation of 
collective action, our work suggests that legitimation processes impose 
important limiting conditions on the emergence and ultimate success of social 
movements.
The studies reported here also permit us to test, in a rudimentary 
fashion, hypotheses concerning the relationship between variations in the
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argued that movements which are able to legitimate their goals and tactics are
propriety or validity of actions and the exercise of sanctions against the 
relevant actors. The initial findings on this issue are puzzling.
In Study 1, 57% (N=29) of the S’s who responded to the questionnaire item 
sanctioned the source of the change message. That is, they indicated that 
they would be unwilling to include that particular group member in a future 
study. In contrast, only 5% (N=3) of S’s in Study 2 were willing to sanction 
the source of the change message. We would like to address two plausible 
explanations for those findings, gender differences in behavior and 
differences in the source of validation.
The gender-role stereotypes which predominate in Western society suggest 
that females and males are socialized to conform to very different gender-role 
expectations (Parsons, 1955, 1970). For example, it is assumed that males 
learn to be assertive, task oriented and active while females are more likely 
to be deferential, socially oriented and passive. Under the assumptions of 
that perspective, it is possible that males and females have quite different 
experiences of the task situation. Additionally, the measure of sanctioning 
in these investigations required S’s to state their unwillingness to work with 
another group member. Such behavior is both aggressive and potentially 
disruptive.12 It is possible that women who comprise the sample of S’s in 
Study 2 are less willing to exercise sanctions than the males who were 
assigned to the task in Study 1.
The gender differences explanation is rendered somewhat less plausible 
when the two groups are compared with respect to variables which tap the 
character of their experiences. First, the men in Study 1 are less likely to 
respond to the sanctioning item than women in Study 2 [58% to 74%]. Second, 
men are less likely to support change than women [35% to 56%]. However, men
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As the data in Table 7 suggest, the two groups compare favorably on a 
number of other variables including their assessments of the effectiveness of 
the wheel [NETEFF1, NETEFF2], the degree to which they express approval of the 
wheel [PR0P1, PR0P2, PROPER] and the extent to which they express approval of
i r A 
/  \the bonus and of the amount of the bonus [BONEVAL, BONAMT].
are slightly more likely to attempt other means of changing the task situation
than women [16% to 12%].
Table 7 about here
A second possibility for explaining the sanctioning findings is 
associated with the source of validation. Our arguments assume that the 
exercise of sanctions ought to be associated with violations of the sense of 
validity rather than violations of propriety. In Study 1, the continued use 
of the wheel is validated through authorization, i.e. by the experimenter’s 
instructions. The host experimenter made it quite clear that changing the 
communication structure prior to the eighth trial was potentially damaging to 
the experiment. Consequently, any attempt to initiate change prior to that 
point violated the experimenter’s and, quite possibly the S’s, purpose for 
participating in the study. The circumstances in Study 2 are qualitatively 
different.
The wheel is validated by endorsement in Study 2. That is, S’s believe 
that a majority of their peers either do not prefer or prefer the wheel.
While endorsement may imply continued use of the wheel, the effects of 
endorsement on that issue are equivocal. Clearly, change does not imply 
violation of the experimenter’s or of the S’s purpose for participating in the
study. Additionally, even if the S initially preferred the wheel and 
continued to do so, it is not clear that another group member should be 
excluded from further studies for advocating a change which ran counter to her 
own preferences and the initial preferences of a majority of the group. It is 
possible that the differences in sanctioning behavior that are observed across 
the two studies are the result of differences in the effects that 
authorization and endorsement have on collective action.13
In summary, our research suggests that propriety, endorsement and 
authorization have important effects on the likelihood that group members will 
offer public support of an emerging collective movement. Our findings with 
respect to the effects of endorsement and authorization on the imposition of 
sanctions against those initiate collective protest are equivocal. It would 
appear that those who initiate protest activities which are not validated run 
the risk of incurring sanctions from collectivity members. On the other hand, 
almost none of the S’s in the study which examined endorsement and propriety 
imposed sanctions on protest leaders. We have suggested that the differences 
in sanctioning behaviors may be due to gender differences in the subject pool, 
or to differences in the effects of authorization and endorsement. While 
there are some indications that the gender differences explanation is the less 
plausible of the two arguments, a definitive answer to the question awaits 
further research.
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Notes
1. The specification of socially desirable behavior permits actors to make 
inferences about that which is socially inappropriate, i.e. not legitimate.
The admonition to honor one’s parents implies that dishonoring them is 
undesirable. Of course, legitimate orders may offer explicit proscriptions as 
well.
2. There are obviously exceptions to this general statement. If P violates 
his queen’s sense of propriety or that of a dictator, it is highly likely that 
P will be punished. However, the imposition of punishment, or the 
distribution of rewards, is problematic even in cases of substantial power 
differences. Queens who hold their positions as a result of constitutional 
provisions will find their capacity to employ sanctions on the basis of 
personal beliefs severely constrained.
3. The preferences of group members were recorded but they were not reported 
to the group. Whether the communication structure was endorsed or not was 
established by standardized feedback which indicated that a majority of the 
group preferred the wheel or an alternate structure. The S’s actual 
preferences can be used as an alternate measure of propriety.
4. A detailed description of the setting and general procedures can be found 
in Thomas, Walker, and Zelditch (1986) or Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch (1986).
5. An experimental room corresponded to each colored token (blue, green, 
orange, red, or yellow). The "orange" room was always occupied by a 
confederate. Consequently, the orange token was never included in the 
drawing.
6. The subjects are told that the earnings are awarded to the team, rather 
than to individuals because no member of the team could possibly construct the 
solution graph without the cooperation of all the team members.
7. The measure of propriety is taken from the subjects’ responses to a 
question on the short questionnaire which asked them to indicate the extent of 
their approval of disapproval of the communication network. Subjects who 
responded "approve," or "highly approve" received a score of 1. Responses 
which were noncommittal or which expressed disapproval were coded 0.
8. The change message always originated from a peer of the subject. In most 
instances, the message originated from the group member whose color code was 
"red." However, if the subject occupied the position assigned to "red," the 
message originated from "blue."
9. The question asked the S whether s/he would include or exclude the 
relevant member from a group to be organized in the future. Admittedly, this 
is a crude measure of sanctioning but its importance lies in asking each 
individual to vote to deny another group member the opportunity to participate 
in future group activities. Our basic arguments as represented in Hypotheses
1.3 and 1.4 suggest that S’s ought to be willing to take such action if the 
target’s actions were not valid. On the other hand, we assume that S’s would
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be unwilling to do so if the actions simply violated their own sense of 
propriety.
10. The all-to-all structure is a communication network which permits direct 
communication between every pair of actors in the network. That is, unlike 
the wheel structure, the communication channels^ between every pair of subjects 
is open.
11. We ran parallel analyses using the S’s preference for structures 
[OWNVOTE] as indicated by her completion of the poll. The results are similar 
in every respect. We have elected to use the analysis based on questionnaire 
responses for both theoretical and methodological reasons. First, our 
previous research (Walker et al., 1988) has demonstrated that post-session 
questionnaire responses are a more accurate indicator of an S’s sense of 
propriety at the point of action than measures taken earlier in the sequence 
of events. Second, N’s of S’s in the two response categories [proper/not 
proper] are more evenly balanced when PROPER [49/31] rather than OWNVOTE 
[60/20] is used as an independent variable in the analysis.
12. S’s were told that some groups would be invited to return to the 
laboratory for future studies. S’s had to indicate if they would be willing 
to return and, effectively, to include or exclude other members of their group 
from future task sessions. While excluding an activist might have 
instrumental benefits, doing so may have been conceived as disruptive of an 
intact group. Concern about disruption may have been especially acute under 
the circumstances of these investigations. The "offenses" of the target 
member are not significant in either a moral or legal sense.
13. The plausibility of this explanation is strengthened by the result of 
another investigation in this series (Walker et al., 1989). Male S’s were 
asked if they would exclude superordinate group members who had imposed 
penalties on them. The procedural rules for assessing penalties either were 
or were not established by majority vote of the group. S’s were more likely 
to indicate a desire to sanction those superiors whose actions violated the 
group standards. The effects of the S’s support of the rules, i.e. propriety, 
was not statistically significant.
While majority vote would appear to be similar to endorsement, it is 
different in one important respect. The balloting process was authorized by 
the experimenter as a mechanism for establishing the group’s operating 
procedures. In the investigation described here, majority preferences had no 
effect on the principles of group functioning. Consequently, endorsement of 
the wheel might be expected to result in effects which are similar to those 
postulated for propriety— effects which are quite different from those 
associated with authorization.
REFERENCES
Bachrach, P. and M. Baratz. 1970. Power and Poverty. New York: Oxford 
Press.
Bavelas, Alex. 1950. "Communications Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups."
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 22:725-30.
Dornbusch, Sanford M. and W. R. Scott. 1975. Evaluation and the Exercise of 
Authority. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Faucheux, C. , and K. D. Mackenzie. 1966. "Task Dependency of Organizational 
Centrality: Its Behavioral Consequences." Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology 2:361-75.
Friedrich, Carl J. 1958. "What is Meant by ,Politically Impossible’?"
American Behavioral Scientist 1 (5):3-5.
Gamson, William A. 1975. The Strategy of Social Protest. Dorsey.
Jackson, Jay. 1965. "Structural Characteristics of Norms." In Ivan D.
Steiner and Martin Fishbein (eds.), Current Studies in Social Psychology. 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Keohane, Robert 0. and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence. 
Stanford.
Lauderdale, Patrick. 1980. Political Analysis of Deviance. University of 
Minnesota Press.
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory." American Journal of Sociology 83:1212- 
41.
Mackenzie, Kenneth D. 1976. A Theory of Group Structure. Gordon & Breach.
26
Parsons, Talcott. 1955. "Family Structure and the Socialization of the 
Child." In Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales (eds.), Family 
Socialization and Interaction Process. Free Press.
Smelser, Neil. 1963. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press.
Stolte, John. 1983. "The Legitimation of Structural Inequality." American 
Sociological Review 48:331-42.
Thomas, G. M., H. A. Walker, and M. Zelditch, Jr. 1986. "Legitimacy and 
Collective Action." Social Forces 65:378-404.
Walker, H. A., G. M. Thomas, and M. Zelditch, Jr. 1986. "Legitimation, 
Endorsement and Stability." Social Forces 64:620-43.
Walker, H. A., L. Rogers, G. M. Thomas, and M. Zelditch, Jr. 1987.
"Legitimating Collective Action: Theory and Experimental Results."
Paper prepared for R. Braungart and M. Braungart (eds.), Research in 
Political Sociology.
Walker, H. A., L. Rogers, and M. Zelditch, Jr. 1989. "All or Nothing: 
Effects of the. Legitimacy of Persons, Positions, and Acts." Paper 
prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Sociological Society, April 6 - 9 ,  St. Louis.
Weber, Max. 1968. Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA.: University of 
California Press.
Zelditch, M., Jr., and H. A. Walker. 1984. "Legitimacy and the Stability of 
Authority." In Edward J. Lawler (ed.), Advances in Group Processes: 
Theory and Research. Vol. 1. JAI Press.
Table 1. Number and Proportion of S’s in Study 1 Supporting Change Proposal
by Propriety and Validity.
Wheel Possesses Propriety
NO YES Row Totals
Wheel Is Valid
NO 10 10 20
[.667] [.345] [ .454]
YES 6 5 11
[ •375] [.179] [.250]
Column Totals 16 15 31
[.516] [.263] [.352]
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Table 2. Logit Analysis of Support of Change Proposal in Study 1 by Propriety
and Validity (Authorization).
Model Coeff.
Model
Chi-Square 
(prob.)
Change 
Chi-Square 
(prob.)
Saturated Model 0.00
(1.00)
Intercept -0.496*
PROPER (P) -0.588*
VALIDITY (V) -0.522*
P x V .080
Main Effects Model .11 .11
(.744) (.744)
Intercept -0.507*
PROPER (P) -0.593*
VALIDITY (A) -0.509*
Single Parameter Models
Propriety 4.74 4.63
( . 09) (< .10)
Intercept -0.483*
PROPER -0.547*
Authorization 6.21 6.10
( . 04) (< .05)
Intercept -0.640**
VALIDITY -0.458*
*p < .05. 1, 1׳i
* * p < •01' y
Table 3. Number and Proportion of S’s in Study 1 Sanctioning Source of Change
Proposal by Propriety and Validity.
Wheel Possesses Propriety
NO YES Row Totals
Wheel Is Valid
NO 2 8 10
[.400] [.421] [.417]
YES 11 8 19
[.846] [.571] [.704]
Column Totals 13 16 29
[.722] [.485] [.569]
Table 4. Logit Analysis of Sanctioning of Source of Change Proposal in Study
1 by Propriety and Validity (Authorization).
Model Coeff.
Model
Chi-Square 
(prob.)
Change 
Chi-Square 
(prob.)
Saturated Model 0.00
(1.00)
Intercept -0.289
PROPER (P) -0.306
VALIDITY (V) -0.608
P x V -0.323
Main Effects Model 1.21 1.21
(.27) (.27)
Intercept -0.393
PROPER (P) -0.377
VALIDITY (A) -0.515
Single Parameter Models
Propriety 6.64 5.43
(.04) (< .10)
Intercept -0.242
PROPER -0.137
Authorization 2.54 1.33
(.28) (> .40)
Intercept -0.264
VALIDITY -0.601*
*p < .05.
Table 5. Number and Proportion of S’s in Study 2 Supporting Change Proposal
by Propriety and Endorsement.
Wheel Possesses Propriety
NO YES Row Totals
Wheel Is Endorsed
NO 16 13 29
[.941] [.565] [.725]
YES 10 6 16
[.714] [.231] [.400]
Column Totals 26 19 45
[.839] [.388] [.563]
-Table 6. Logit Analysis of Support of Change Proposal in Study 2 by Propriety
and Endorsement.
Model Coeff.
Model
Chi-Square 
(prob.)
Change 
Chi-Square 
(prob.)
Saturated Model
Intercept 
PROPER (P) 
ENDORSE (E)
P x E
-0.587*
-1.036**
*0.738־
0.038-
0.00
(1.00)
Main Effects Model .09 .09
Intercept 
PROPER (P)
ENDORSE (E)
Single Parameter Models
-0.650*
-1.126**
-0.778**
(.768) (.768)
Propriety
Intercept
PROPER
-0.596*
-1.053**
8.89
(.01)
8.80 
(< .05)
Authorization
Intercept
ENDORSE
-0.282
-0.687*
16.95
(.00)
16.86 
(< .001)
*p < .05.
** p < .01.
Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables from Study 1 and
Study 2.
Variable Description
Mean 
Study 1*
Mean 
Study 2
SUPPORT S supports change proposal . 351 .56
[ .48]2 [ •50]
ALTENDRS S initiated change proposal .161 .12
[ .37] [ .33]
NETEFF1 First measure of network
efficiency 1.88 1.58
[1.17] [ •82]
NETEFF2 Second measure of network
efficiency 1.83 1.66
[1.17] [ .87]
PR0P1 First measure propriety of
wheel 3.99 3.84
[1.20] [1.08]
PR0P2 Second measure propriety of
wheel 3.63 3.57
[1.41] [1.21]
BONEVAL Propriety of awarding bonus 4.29 4.05
[1.25] [1.12]
BONAMT Propriety of bonus amount 3.91 3.76
[ •88] [ .89]
PROPER Propriety of wheel . 651 .61
[ .48] [ •49]
SANCTDEV S sanctions source of change
proposal . 571 .05
[ .50] [ .22]
*S’s in Study 1 are male undergraduates while S’s in Study 2 are female. 
1Categorical [0,1] variables. Remaining variables measured on five-point 
scales.
2Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
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TABLE 1. Percent of the Baseline Rate of Change Initiated by Peripheral 
Positions That is Delayed or Prevented by Various Manipulations of
Legitimacy and Power3
Percent of Baseline
Rate of Change
Experimental Condition N Delayed or Prevented*3
Inequality is justified by differences in relative 
contributions to the task 21 63%**
Change would damage the objectives of the experiment 31 67%**
Collective change is politically impossible 20 43%
Peers believe that the existing structure of the 
communication system is appropriate 40c 49%**
A power legitimated by E prefers the existing 
communication system 24 60%*
A power legitimated by E could sanction S if he 
preferred the existing system 24 58%**
Notes:
3From Zelditch, M.; Harris, W.; Thomas, G.; and Walker, H.A., "Decisions, 
Nondecisions, and Metadecisions," in Kriesberg, L. (ed.)» Research in 
Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change, Vol. 5, JAI Press, 1983, pp. 1-32.
^There are small changes in procedure from experiment to experiment, but 
each comparision is made to an exactly similar baseline.
0Pooled data from two experiments. After being run with males, the same 
condition was replicated on females. There were no differences by sex.
*P < . 05
* * P <  .01
TABLE 2. Proportion of Change-Responses Endorsed by Peers 
under Various Conditions of Validity and Propriety with Statistics 
of Best-Fitting Logistic Regression.
Cond it ion N
Proportion
Endorsing
Change-Response
Statistics of Best-Fitting 
Regression
Logistic
Effect Parameter (antilog)3 Chi Square^ P
Baseline 22 .27 Grand Mean -.8718 (.4182) 4.39 .04
Bonus 22 . 64 Bonus 1.3369 (3.8072) 4.74 .03
Validity 20 .15 Validity -1.0682 (.3436) 7.16 .01
Interaction 24 .33 Interaction0 n.s
Notes :
aThe magnitude of an effect can be read from the anti-log of its parameter: The 
bonus, which makes the communication network improper, increases endorsement of 
a change-response by other by almost 4 times the rate of endorsement when there 
is no bonus. Validity reduces support of change by about a third.
bchi square for the model is 11.87, with 2 df, p = .003.
cIn the best-fitting model there is no estimate for the interaction effect because 
it is not significant. The second-best model has a significant interaction but 
is less parsimonious, because there is no validity main effect, thus requiring 
a more complex interpretation, and fits slightly less well, p = .007.
TABLE 3. Rejection of Confederate Who Proposed Change by 
Validity of Change and Propriety of Structure 
(Omitting "No Answers") with Statistics of Analysis of Variance.
Condition N Meana
Analysis of Variance
Source of 
Variation
Sum of 
Squares df F P
Baseline 12 -0.42 Propriety 7.966 1 4.667 .04
Bonus 7 1.29 Validity 2.555 1 1.497 .23
Validity 7 0.86 Interaction 4.923 1 2.884 .10
Interaction 8 1.00 Residual 51.202 30
Total 34 0.53 Total 68.471 33
3Mean score of S's answer to a question asking if S would want to work again 
with the individual who proposed change when E brings the group back at a 
later date. The same question was asked of each other person in the group. 
Answers were scaled from +2 (very much) to -2 (very negative).
TABLE 4. Proportion of Change-Responses Endorsed by Peers 
Under Various Conditions of Propriety and Majority 
Endorsement of Communication Network.
Bonus
Condition3
Endorsement N
Proportion Endorsing a 
Change-Response by Otherb
No Wheel 20 .05
No All-All 20 .55
Y es Wheel 20 .75
Yes All-All 20 .90
Notes:
aA bonus is assumed to make the wheel improper and the all-to-all proper 
b X2 = 33.47, 1 df, P C . 0001.
